. Most of the literature concerning the price of anarchy has focused on the search on tight bounds for speci c classes of games, such as congestion games and, in particular, routing games. Some papers have studied the price of anarchy as a function of some parameter of the model, such as the tra c demand in routing games, and have provided asymptotic results in light or heavy tra c. We study the price of anarchy in nonatomic routing games in the central region of the tra c demand. We start studying some regularity properties of Wardrop equilibria and social optima. We focus our attention on break points, that is, values of the demand where at all equilibria the set of paths used changes. Then we show that, for a ne cost functions, local maxima of the price of anarchy can occur only at break points. We prove that their number is nite, but can be exponential in the size of the network.
Nonatomic congestion games provide a model for the distribution of tra c along a network where a large number of players operate and each single player controls a negligible fraction of the total tra c. The model is based on a directed graph with one origin and one destination and the cost is identi ed with the delay incurred to go from origin to destination. The delay on an edge is a nondecreasing function of the mass of players on that edge and the delay of a path is additive over the edges of the path. The social cost is the total delay experienced by the whole tra c on the network. The solution concept that is used in this class of models is the Wardrop equilibrium: in equilibrium ows are split among paths having minimum cost. Therefore, all the paths used in equilibrium have the same cost and the equilibrium social cost is just the equilibrium cost along each used path times the total tra c demand. Equilibria are known to be ine cient, i.e., a social planner would be able to redirect ows along the network in a way that reduces the social cost. The most common measure of ine ciency of equilibria is the price of anarchy, i.e., the ratio of the equilibrium social cost over the optimum social cost. For nonatomic congestion games with a ne costs, the value of the price of anarchy is bounded above by 4/3, and this bound is sharp (Roughgarden and Tardos, 2002) . Moreover, for a large class of cost functions, that include all polynomials, the price of anarchy (PoA) converges to 1 as the tra c demand goes either to 0 or to in nity. In other words, equilibria tend to perfect e ciency both in light and heavy tra c (Colini-Baldeschi et al., frth). Some studies have empirically shown that in real life for medium tra c demand the price of anarchy tends to oscillate and often does not even reach its worst bound. The shape and number of these oscillations is the object of this paper, where we will provide theoretical results for the behavior of the price of anarchy focusing mainly on networks with a ne costs.
1.1. Our contribution. In this paper we consider nonatomic routing games on a network with a single origin-destination and nondecreasing continuous costs. We look at the price of anarchy as a function of the tra c demand and study the properties of this function. We provide some general results and then we focus on a ne cost functions. The main idea of the paper is that, in agreement with with existing empirical results, when costs functions are a ne, local maxima of the PoA are achieved when the set of paths that are used at equilibrium changes. To study these changes we need some preliminary results concerning regularity properties of the equilibrium. First of all we resort to the classical result in Beckmann et al. (1956) according to which a Wardrop equilibrium is a solution of a convex optimization program and we prove that the value of this program is convex and di erentiable as a function of the tra c demand. Then we show that the equilibrium cost is continuously di erentiable in a neighborhood of a demand point where strict complementarity conditions hold and that similar results hold also for the optimum under weaker conditions. When the tra c demand grows, there exist points where the set of used paths in all equilibria changes. We call them break points.
We then turn our attention to a class of cost functions that are heavily used in applications, namely, the ones proposed by the Bureau of Public Roads, and we show that for these cost functions we have a scaling law between the equilibrium and optimum ows. This produces a similar scaling for the break points. Moreover, for a ne cost functions, the number of break points is nite for every possible nite network. Although it is nite, there exist classes of networks where the number of break points is exponential in the number of paths. The relevance of break points is due to the fact that between break points the PoA is either monotone or it has a unique minimum, therefore, the PoA can have a local maximum only at a break point.
When cost functions are a ne, if an equilibrium uses a certain set of paths at two di erent demand levels, then it uses the same set of paths at all intermediate demands. In the nal section we show that this does not hold for less regular cost functions.
1.2. Related Work. The solution concept that is typically used in nonatomic routing games, and that we adopt in this paper, is due to Wardrop (1952) and its mathematical properties were studied rst by Beckmann et al. (1956) . Algoritms for computing the equilibrium and the optimum solutions were proposed by Tomlin (1966) when cost functions are a ne and by Dafermos and Sparrow (1969) for general convex costs. For a recent survey on the topic, we refer to Correa and Stier-Moses (2011) .
The recognition that sel sh behavior of agents produces social ine ciency goes back at least to Pigou (1920) . A measure quantifying this ine ciency was proposed by Papadimitriou (1999, 2009 ). This measure is the ratio of the social cost of the worst equilibrium over the optimum social cost. It was termed price of anarchy by Papadimitriou (2001) . A price of anarchy close to one indicates e ciency of the equilibria of the game, whereas a high price of anarchy implies that, in the worst scenario, strategic behavior can lead to relevant social ine ciency. Most of the subsequent literature has studied sharp bounds for the price of anarchy in some speci c classes of games. Several papers applied the idea of the price of anarchy to congestion games and in particular to tra c games on networks. In particular Roughgarden and Tardos (2002) showed that for every congestion games with a ne cost the price of anarchy is bounded above by 4/3. Moreover, this bound is sharp and attained in a tra c game with a simple two-edge parallel network. Roughgarden (2003) generalized this result to polynomial functions of maximum degree d and proved that the price of anarchy grows as Θ(d/log d). Dumrauf and Gairing (2006) re ned the result when the cost functions are sums of monomials whose degrees are between q and d. Roughgarden and Tardos (2004) generalized the analysis to all di erentiable cost function c such that xc(x) is convex. Less regular cost functions and di erent optimizing criteria for the social cost were studied by Correa et al. (2004 Correa et al. ( , 2007 Correa et al. ( , 2008 .
Some papers took a more applied view and studied the actual value of the price of anarchy in real life situations. For instance Youn et al. ( , 2009 ) dealt with tra c in Boston, London, and New York. They observed that the price of anarchy varies with tra c demand and shows a similar pattern in the three cities: it is 1 when tra c is light, it oscillates in the central region and then goes back to 1 when tra c increases. A similar behavior was observed by O'Hare et al. (2016) , who-taking an approach that relates to the one of our paper-showed how an expansion and retraction of the routes used at equilibrium or at a social optimum a ect the behavior of the price of anarchy. An analytical justi cation for the asymptotic behavior of the price of anarchy has been provided by Colini-Baldeschi et al. (frth, 2017 , Wu et al. (2019) . Colini-Baldeschi et al. (2016 considered the case of single origin-destination parallel networks and proved that, in heavy tra c, the price of anarchy converges to one when the cost functions are regularly varying. Their results were extended in various directions in Colini-Baldeschi et al. (frth, 2017) : general networks have been considered and both the light and heavy tra c asymptotics have been studied. A di erent technique, called scalability, has been used by Wu et al. (2017 Wu et al. ( , 2019 Wu et al. ( , 2018 to study the case of heavy tra c.
The behavior of the price of anarchy as a function of a di erent parameter was studied by Cominetti et al. (2019) . In this case the parameter of interest is the probability that players actually take part in a congestion game. Colini-Baldeschi et al. (2018) studied the possibility of achieving e ciency in tra c routing games via the use of tolls, when the demand can vary.
In a more applied direction, Monnot et al. (2017) studied the commuting behavior of a large number of Singaporean students and showed that the e ciency of the system is far from the worst case scenario and the price of anarchy is overall low. Gemici et al. (2019) have dealt with the income inequality e ects of reducing the price of anarchy via tolls.
1.3. Organization of the paper. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the concepts of equilibrium and optimum are introduced and their properties are studied, as a function of the demand. In Section 3 the price of anarchy is introduced, together with some of its general properties. The behavior of the PoA is studied in Section 4 in the case of a ne costs and in Section 5 for general costs.
T
We consider a standard nonatomic routing game with a single origin-destination pair. The network is described by directed graph G = (V, E) with vertex set V, edge set E ⊆ V × V, an origin O ∈ V and a destination D ∈ V. The tra c in ow is given by a positive real number m ≥ 0, interpreted as vehicles per hour, to be routed along the set P of all simple paths from O to D. We assume each vertex v ∈ V is accessible from the origin O and can reach the destination D, so that there is a path p ∈ P passing through v. The nonatomic hypothesis means that each vehicle controls a negligible fraction of the total tra c.
We call F m the set of feasible path-ow distributions of tra c given by vectors f = (f p ) p ∈P with nonnegative entries f p ≥ 0 and such that p ∈P f p = m. Every feasible path-ow f ∈ F m induces a load pro le x = (x e ) e ∈E over the edges, with x e = p e f p representing the amount of tra c that travels over the edge e. We call X m the set of all such load pro les. Note that the correspondence between ows and feasible load pro les is not bijective, since in some networks a given load pro le could be induced by more than one ow.
Every edge e ∈ E has an associated cost function c e : [0, +∞) −→ [0, +∞), which is assumed nondecreasing and of class C 1 , i.e., continuous and di erentiable with continuous derivative. The value c e (x e ) represents the travel time (or unit cost) of traversing the edge when the load is x e . When tra c distributes according to a path-ow f = (f p ) p ∈P with induced load pro le x = (x e ) e ∈E , the cost experienced by traveling on a path p ∈ P is given by
(2.1)
Notice that, with a slight abuse of language, we use the same symbol c for the cost function over paths and over edges. The meaning will be clear from the context. The total cost experienced by all users traveling across the network is called the social cost and is denoted by
x e c e (x e ).
( 2.2) 2.1. Wardrop equilibrium. A feasible path-ow f * ∈ F m is called a Wardrop equilibrium if the paths that are actually used have minimum cost. Formally, f * ∈ F m is an equilibrium i there exists λ ∈ such that
( 2.3)
The quantity λ is called the equilibrium cost, which is a function of m.
As noted by Beckmann et al. (1956) , Wardrop equilibria coincide with the optimal solutions of the convex minimization problem
where C e (·) is the primitive of the edge cost c e (·), namely
This follows by noting that Eq. (2.3) are the optimality conditions for V (m), with the equilibrium cost λ playing the role of a Lagrange multiplier for the constraint p f p = m. It follows that, for each xed in ow m ≥ 0, an equilibrium ow f * always exists. A Wardrop equilibrium always exists. Although it is not necessarily unique, all equilibria induce the same edge travel times τ e (m) c e (x * e ). In particular they have the same equilibrium cost λ = λ(m), which is simply the shortest (O, D) distance:
As a matter of fact, as proved by Fukushima (1984) , the equilibrium edge costs τ e = τ e (m) are the unique optimal solution of the strictly convex dual program
where τ 0 e = c e (0). Since in equilibrium all the paths that carry ow have the same cost λ(m), it follows that all equilibria have exactly the same social cost, namely
A less known property is the fact that the optimal value function m → V (m) is a smooth convex function with V (m) = λ(m). We summarize the previous discussion in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.1. The function m → V (m) is convex and di erentiable for m > 0, with V (m) = λ(m) continuous and nondecreasing. Moreover, the equilibrium edge costs τ e (m) are uniquely de ned and are continuous as a function of m. If the costs c e (·) are strictly increasing, the equilibrium edge loads x * e (m) = c −1 e (τ e (m)) are also unique and depend continuously on m.
Under additional hypothesis we can prove the di erentiability of the equilibrium cost λ(m). Given a vertex v ∈ V, call N + (v) and N − (v) the sets of out-edges and in-edges of v, respectively, and P(O, v) the set of all paths from O to v. Then, an equilibrium load pro le (x * e ) e ∈E for a total in ow of m is characterized as a solution of the following system of equations and inequalities:
10) 13) where τ e is the equilibrium cost of edge e and
is the equilibrium cost of a shortest path from the origin O to vertex v.
Remark 2.1. Writing Eq. (2.10) for each vertex gives a set of linearly dependent equations, which can be made independent by removing (any) one of them. Equation (2.12) requires that either x e or (T w − T v − τ e ) is zero. We say that strict complementarity holds if for every edge exactly one of the two expressions is zero while the other is not zero. In the sequel we consider the active network comprising all the edges that are on a shortest path from O to D, that is to say, the edges that satisfy Eq. (2.11) with equality. We also de ne a break point as a point m 0 at which this active network changes.
De nition 2.3. For each m ∈ (0, ∞) we de ne the active network as
The in ow rate m 0 is a break point for the equilibrium if there exists ε > 0 such that E * (m) is constant over the intervals
Remark 2.2. By de nition, an edge e that is inactive at m 0 satis es 16) so that, by continuity of τ e (m) and T v (m), the edge remains inactive for m near m 0 .
Remark 2.3. Let f * be any equilibrium for the in ow m 0 , and x * the induced edge loads. From (2.12), every edge that carries a positive ow must be active, that is to say
In particular, every path p ∈ P with f * p > 0 is completely included in the active network E * (m 0 ). Note however that the set on the left of Eq. (2.17) depends on the particular equilibrium that is chosen, whereas E * (m 0 ) is intrinsically de ned for each m 0 .
Remark 2.4. If the costs c e (·) are strictly increasing and strict complementarity holds at m 0 , then Eq. (2.17) holds with equality. In this case, by continuity, all active edges remain active for m near m 0 , which combined with Remark 2.2 implies that the active network is locally constant. In other words, for strictly increasing costs, a break point can occur at m 0 only if strict complementarity fails.
Remark 2.5. Given a selection of equilibrium ows m → f * (m), the values m at which the set of used paths changes can be di erent from the break points, which are de ned independently of the ow. This is due to the possible non-uniqueness of equilibrium. For instance, consider the network in Fig. 1 . When m ∈ [2, +∞), the ow path
is an equilibrium of mass m for any choice of ε in [0, 1]. So, by letting ε oscillate between 0 and 1 arbitrarily often, we may build equilibrium ows such that the set of used paths change an arbitrary number of times. Nevertheless, the active network at equilibrium in the whole interval [2, +∞) is always the set of edges in all four paths, each of which has cost equal to 2 in any equilibrium.
Optimum ow.
A feasible path-ow f ∈ F m is called an optimum ow if it minimizes the social cost, that is to say, f is an optimal solution of 18) where C e (x e ) = x e c e (x e ). Since c e (·) is C 1 , it follows that the marginal cost functions c e (x e ) C e (x e ) = c e (x e ) + x e c e (x e ) (2.19) are well de ned and continuous. If we further assume C e (·) to be convex, then c e (·) is nondecreasing and it follows that the optimal ows coincide with the Wardrop equilibria f ∈ F m for the marginal costs c e (·). We denote λ(m) the corresponding equilibrium cost, E(m) the active network, and m 0 the break points. Proposition 2.1 then yields the following direct consequence:
Corollary 2.4. Suppose that c e (·) are C 1 and nondecreasing with x e → x e c e (x e ) convex. Then the optimal social cost map m → V (m) is a C 1 convex function with V (m) = λ(m) continuous and nondecreasing.
2.3. A scaling law for BPR cost functions. The Bureau of Public Roads (BPR) proposed a class of cost functions that are monomials of degree d ∈ plus a constant, namely
For BPR costs we have the following scaling law that relates the equilibrium and optimum ows. 
is an optimum, which implies the corresponding scaling law on the ows:
Remark 2.6. Note that when the cost functions are BPR, the break points for the equilibrium are in one-to-one correspondence with the break points for the optimum, namely
(2.23)
P A
Since every equilibrium ow has the same equilibrium cost, we can de ne the price of anarchy (PoA) for each m ∈ [0, +∞) as the ratio between the social cost at an equilibrium ow f * (m) and the social cost at an optimum ow f (m): Proof. Recall from Sections 2.1 and 2.2 that the social cost at equilibrium is equal to m · λ(m) and is continuous on [0, +∞), while the social cost at optimum is di erentiable on (0, +∞). This implies the rst part of the proposition. The second part is a consequence of Proposition 2.2.
Remark 3.1. The break points at equilibrium are natural candidates to be points of non-di erentiability for the equilibrium cost λ(m) and the Price of Anarchy PoA(m). On the other hand the break points at optimum do not contribute to create rst order irregularities for the PoA.
N
In this section we consider a ne cost functions, i.e., cost functions c e ∈ C BPR (1):
with a e , b e ≥ 0 for each e ∈ E.
Proposition 4.1. Let ρ ⊂ P. For 0 < m < m assume that there exists two corresponding equilibrium ows f of demand m and f of demand m, which both use the subset ρ. Then, for every m ≤ m ≤ m, there exists an equilibrium ow f * (m) that uses ρ.
Remark 4.1. Proposition 4.1 implies that, in the case of a ne cost functions, any given active network can appear over a certain interval, but once it changes it cannot repeat itself afterwards. Furthermore, as it will be clear from the proof, between break points there exists an a ne selection of equilibrium, which means that between break points, we can choose an equilibrium ow of the form
where w and z are two constant vectors in n with n i=1 w i = 1 and
4.1. Number of break points.
Proposition 4.2. For a ne edge costs, the number of break points for the equilibrium is nite.
Proof. Since the number of all possible subset of P is nite and since the active network at equilibrium cannot repeat itself (see Remark 4.1), the result follows.
Even for a ne costs, the number of break points can be exponential in the number of paths.
Proposition 4.3. There exist networks with a ne costs where P has n elements and the number of break points is of the order of 2 n/2 .
4.2.
Behavior of the Price of Anarchy. We now prove that the social cost at the equilibrium and at the optimum have a very similar form.
Proposition 4.4. Let m k and m k+1 be two consecutive break points for the equilibrium. We have:
The behavior of the PoA between break points has a very speci c form, which implies that local maxima can exist only at breaking points. • The PoA has at most one stationary point in (m, m).
• The PoA does not attain a local maximum in (m, m). 
G
When the cost functions have less regular shapes, the set of paths used at equilibrium can have a recurring behavior.
Proposition 5.1. The active network at equilibrium E * (m) can repeat itself over disjoint intervals de ned by break points.
Proof. Consider the network in Fig. 4 with the cost c( with 0 < ε < a < γ < γ + ε < b, and in the interval [γ , γ + ε] we interpolate in any way that makes c(x) continuous and nondecreasing in the whole [0, +∞]. Then we have the following regimes:
• when m ∈ [0, a], the equilibrium ow uses only the path {O, v 1 , v 2 , D}, the load on the two edges {O, v 2 }, and {v 1 , D} is zero and the equilibrium cost is λ(m) = 2m; • when m ∈ (a, 2a), the equilibrium ow uses all the three paths with the following distribution path {O, v 1 , v 2 , D} {O, v 1 , D} {O, v 2 , D} ow 2a − m m − a m − a the load on the two edges {O, v 2 }, {v 1 , D} is m − a < γ , and the equilibrium cost is λ(m) = 2a;
• when m ∈ [2a, 2γ ], the equilibrium ow splits equally between the two paths {O, v 1 , D}, {O, v 2 , D}, the load on the two edges {O, v 2 }, {v 1 , D} is m/2 ≤ γ , and the equilibrium cost is λ(m) = m/2+a; • when m ∈ [b + γ + ε, 2b), the equilibrium ow uses all the three paths with the following distribution path {O,
m − b the load on the two edges {O, v 2 }, {v 1 , D} is m −b ≥ γ +ε, and the equilibrium cost is λ(m) = 2b;
• when m ≥ 2b, , the equilibrium ow splits equally between the two paths {O, v 1 , D}, {O, v 2 , D}, and the load on the two edges {O, v 2 }, {v 1 , D} is m/2 > γ + ε. This proves the Proposition, as in the third and fth analyzed interval the equilibrium uses only the two paths {O, v 1 , D} and {O, v 2 , D}, while in the second and fourth analyzed interval it uses all three paths.
Remark 5.1. Note that in the same way one can construct examples of networks with an in nite number of break points for the equilibrium. Furthermore one can make the increasing sequence of such break points to be convergent. Proof of Proposition 2.1. This is a consequence of the convex duality theorem. Indeed, consider the perturbation function φ m : |P | × → ∪ {+∞}, given by
Clearly φ m is a proper closed convex function (Rockafellar, 1997, page 24) . Calling
we have v m (z) = V (m + z) and in particular v m (0) = V (m), which we consider as the primal convex minimization problem (P m ). From general convex duality, we have that z → v m (z) is a convex function, and therefore so is m → V (m). Moreover, the perturbation function φ m yields a corresponding dual
where φ * m is the Fenchel conjugate function, that is, which imply that λ is the equilibrium cost for the Wardrop equilibrium, that is, λ = λ(m). It follows that ∂V (m) = {λ(m)} so that m → V (m) is not only convex but also di erentiable with V (m) = λ(m). The conclusion follows by noting that every convex di erentiable function is automatically of class C 1 , with V (m) nondecreasing.
The continuity of the equilibrium edge costs τ e = τ e (m) is a consequence of Berge's Maximum Theorem (see, e.g., Aliprantis and Border, 2006, Section 17.5) . Indeed, the equilibrium edge costs are optimal solutions for the dual program in Eq. (2.7). Since the objective function is jointly continuous in (τ , m), Berge's Theorem implies that the optimal solution correspondence is upper-semicontinous. However, in this case the optimal solution is unique, so that the optimal correspondence is single-valued, and, therefore, the equilibrium edge costs τ e (m) are continuous. The last claim about the continuity of the equilibrium edge loads x * e (m) follows directly from this. Proof of Proposition 2.2. First observe that we have a unique equilibrium load pro le, since in this case the equilibrium is a solution of a strictly convex program, because the cost functions are strictly increasing.
We know that the equilibrium load pro le (x e ) e ∈E at mass m must satisfy Eqs. (2.10), (2.12) and (2.13) for some τ e , T v .
First, we observe that the edge equilibrium costs τ e (m) are continuous (see Section 2.1) and so also the equilibrium costs T v (m) of a shortest path to any vertex v are continuous, as well as the functions
, for all e = (v, w). Since strict complementarity holds at m 0 , according to Remark 2.3 the active network is constant in a neighborhood of m 0 and x * e (m) = 0 for all e E * (m) and m near m 0 . So, let E 0 = E(m 0 ) denote the active network in a neighborhood of m 0 , and V 0 the corresponding vertices. Now consider Eqs. (2.10), (2.12) and (2.13) relative to the edges in E 0 and remove one dependent equation from Eq. (2.10) (the one relative to vertex D), and add the equation T O = 0. We obtain the following system:
The equilibrium loads x e satisfy such system of equations for some τ e , e ∈ E 0 , and T v , v ∈ V 0 . We want to apply the implicit function theorem to this system of equations, and, to do this, we have to check that the associated linearized system has a unique solution.
Let u e , δ v and s e be respectively the increments in the variables x e , T v and τ e for each e ∈ E 0 and v ∈ V 0 . The homogeneous linear system obtained from (A.4)-(A.7) is the following:
Strict complementarity on an active link implies that Eq. (A.9) is equivalent to .12) which, together with Eq. (A.10), gives Hence, under strict complementarity, every solution of (A.8)-(A.10) corresponds to an optimal solution of (P). Since u e = 0 for all e ∈ E 0 is feasible, it is also the unique optimal solution. It follows that u e = 0 for all e ∈ E 0 , and Eq. (A.10) yields s e = 0 for all e ∈ E 0 . Finally, from Eqs. (A.11) and (A.12) we obtain also δ v = 0 for all v ∈ V 0 .
We showed that the linear system (A.8)-(A.11) has only the trivial solution, thus the Jacobian of (A.4)-(A.7) with respect to x, τ ,T is invertible and the implicit function theorem implies the smoothness of the solution. In particular λ(m) = T D (m) is continuously di erentiable.
Proof of Proposition 2.5. Let x * (m) and x(m) ∈ E + be the load pro les induced, respectively, by the equilibrium ow f * (m) and the optimum ow f (m). The equilibrium load pro le x * (m) is characterized by the inclusion (A.14) which, in the case of BPR cost functions, assumes the form
for each m ∈ [0, +∞). Now, observe that the expression in Eq. (A.17) identi es a load pro le of mass m that, scaled by 1/(d + 1) 1/d , minimizes the social cost. Hence such ow is equal to the optimum load pro le
A.2. Proofs of Section 4. Let n be the cardinality of P, i.e., the number of paths from origin to destination, and we consider the set of paths P = (p i ) i=1, ...,n indexed by the numbers 1, . . . , n. We can de ne an n × n matrix A = (A i j ) i, j=1, ...,n and a vector B = (B i ) i=1, ...,n in the following way:
so that when some ow f = (f i ) i=1, ...,n is using the network, the cost of using path p i
is given by the i-th entry of the vector A · f + B.
Let ρ ⊂ P be the set of paths used at some equilibrium ow f * ∈ n , with equilibrium cost λ ∈ . Then we have that f * satis es the following linear system in the variable f : .18) where the matrix A (ρ) = (A (ρ) i j ) i, j=1, ...,n and the vectors
..,n are de ned in the following way:
Lemma A.1. The matrix A has the following properties:
• A is symmetric with nonnegative entries • A ii ≥ A i j for every j i • A is semi-positive de nite • A (ρ) satis es the three properties above for every ρ ∈ R.
Proof of Lemma A.1. All the A i j are nonnegative because a e ≥ 0 for each e ∈ E. Moreover A i j = A ji because p i ∩ p j = p j ∩ p i . The matrix A is semi-positive de nite because A = X t DX where D is the |E | × |E | diagonal matrix with the elements (a e ) e ∈E on the diagonal, which are all nonnegative, and X is the |E | × |P | matrix de ned in the following way
Note that A (ρ) is obtained from A by substituting A ii with 1 if p i ρ and A i j with 0 when p i or p j are not in ρ. Hence, the properties proved for A hold also for A (ρ) .
Proof of Proposition 4.1. Since ρ ⊂ P is the set of paths used by both f and f , we must have
for some λ, λ ≥ 0, where the inequalities between vectors mean that they hold at every respective entry of the vectors on both sides. Considering a convex combination of the two rows of relations above, with coe cients α ∈ (0, 1) and 1 − α we obtain
which says that the ow α f + (1 − α)f is an equilibrium ow of mass αm + (1 − α)m.
Proof of Proposition 4.3. Let G 1 be the simplest network with one path from origin to destination
and let G 2 be the following two-link parallel network
c 1 (t) = t c 2 (t) = 1 + t and de ne the network G n with origin O n and destination D n inductively as the following
where k n is a constant such that
where m n−2 is the largest break point at equilibrium of the network G n−2 , and λ n−2 (m n−2 ) is the relative equilibrium cost. Note that:
• The network G n has exactly n paths from O n to D n . Indeed G 1 has one path, the network G 2 has two, and G n has the number of paths of G n−2 plus two: the external parallel ones.
• The network G n has twice the number of break points for the equilibrium than G n−2 plus one.
Indeed, when the demand is less or equal to m n−2 the active network at equilibrium for G n contains the same paths of the active network for G n−2 , where we extend such paths with the edges {O n , O n−2 } and {D n−2 , D n }. Hence, in this interval, we observe the same number of break points of G n−2 . The relative equilibrium cost is λ n (m) = λ n−2 (m) + 2m, so for some m > m n−2 the equilibrium cost λ n (m) becomes equal to k n and the two external paths {O n , O n−2 , D n } and {O n , D n−2 , D n } start being used at equilibrium. When this happens the tra c owing through the internal subnetwork G n−2 decreases until it vanishes completely when m is such that m = 2·k n . During this unloading of the internal subnetwork we go through the same active networks we observe during the loading interval, where we add to those active networks the two external paths. Thus, we observe again the same number of break points of the network G n−2 .
This two facts, and noting that G 1 has one break point for the equilibrium and G 2 has two, prove the proposition. These properties also allow us to prove the second part of the Proposition. In fact, when 2m ∈ (m k , m k +1 ) an optimum ow will be f (m) = w · m + z 2 because of the scaling law in Eq. (2.22) for networks with BPR cost functions. Then the social cost at optimum will be a quadratic function in m with the same quadratic and linear coe cient of the social cost at equilibrium, while the constant coe cient will be 1 4 Az, z + 1 2 B, z , which is less or equal to Az, z + B, z = 0 since Az, z ≥ 0 and B, z ≤ 0. which can have at most one positive zero since αγ ≤ 0 and 2βγ ≤ 0. Furthermore, a local maximum cannot be attained because the unique stationary point can exist only when βδ − αε > 0, which implies that the derivative of the PoA is positive for values of m larger than the one at the stationary point.
Details of Example 4.1. The network in Fig. 2 is the G 5 network de ned in the proof of Proposition 4.3, where we chose k 3 = 1 and k 5 = 7. 
